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ABSTRACT
Lindsay Blaire Beeman: The Limits of Laicite: Islam and the Headscarf in France
(Under the direction of Dr. Susan Grayzel)
Laicite is the term given to France’s complex policy of separation between church
and state. Developing out of a long and tumultuous religious history, laicite set out to
resolve the problems that the French state had with religion by eliminating its presence in
the public sphere. At its inception, the policy did not have clearly stated objectives. As a
result, it was not equally applied and many problems ensued.
The most recent debacle involving the application of laicite was Vaffaire dii
foulard, or headscarf affair. Citing the principle of laicite, numerous teachers and
principals in French schools required Muslim students to remove their headcoverings
during class or on school premises. The Muslim community, which is largely composed
of Maghrebi immigrants to France, resented the new application of the principle because
they believed the French state was discriminating against them as other religious symbols
were allowed in schools. The conflict reached the French Conseil d’etat and President
Jacques Chirac requested that a special council be convened to review the state of laicite
in France.
The council that reviewed the policy of laicite in light of the headscarf affair
brought attention to several of the policy’s great shortcomings. Three things the policy set
out to accomplish were: to create unity among French citizens by eliminating religious
factions and dissension in the public realm, to ease the transition of immigrant
communities into the French social sphere, and to ensure religious freedom for all. In
effect, however, the policy has not simply failed to achieve these goals, but has actually
exacerbated the very problems it set out to resolve. It has created discord instead of unity,
placed a greater hardship on immigrant commimities, and restricted everyone’s freedom
of expression as result of the headscarf ban.
France has an obligation to its citizens. The policy of laicite has proven
ineffective and a hindrance to the French state’s ability to fulfill its social contract with
the people. As such, the policy should be drastically amended or altogether rejected in
favor of a more equitable and realistic policy.
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The Limits ofLaicite: An Introduction
Early one morning, a young Muslim girl, named Samira' awakened to discover a
bad hair day and the marks of a botched experiment with henna from the day before. In a
hurry, she went about her normal morning routine, dressing and preparing for school. On
this particular day she was especially grateful for her hijab^ because it allowed her to
cover the mess that was her hair and her embarrassing henna mistake.

Samira had

recently become especially conscious of her headscarf because it appeared to attract
increasingly controversial media coverage,

It seemed that she could hardly pass a

newsstand without seeing a headline about the head coverings.
She arrived at school shortly before class began and slipped through the gates of
her college only to find herself the immediate object of nastiness she had never before
experienced. As she made her way toward her classroom she heard quiet hissing under
the breath of other students, some even made comments like “go home. These were
former friendly acquaintances. Samira was stunned and disoriented. She didn’t know
what to make ofthese hostile comments from her classmates and friends. ^
Many

students

like

Samira

have

experienced

similar

persecution

and

discrimination for wearing a Muslim headscarf in French schools and have been asked to
remove them upon threat of expulsion for non-compliance. Why is the headscarf such

'Name has been changed.
^ Arabic term for an Islamic headscarf.
’Koonz, Claudia, personal communication, 2/27/2007.
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divisive issue in France today, and what is this notion of laicite that emerges in each
conversation about the headscarf?
Laicite, the term given to France’s unique policy of separation between church
and state, is a complex idea that deserves attention and study if one is to understand the
recent debacle over the hijab, or Muslim headscarf, in France and the resulting law of 15
March 2004 in which the wearing of the headscarf was banned in public schools.
The notion of laicite, along with its history, meaning, and evolution will be
explored in this paper. The intent of the policy of laicite will be studied by looking first
at the key events in its development and then at the report of the 2003 Stasi commission
that reviewed the policy in light of the headscarf affair. Although laicite has several
goals, three of the primary objectives of laicite were to ensure unity among the citizens in
keeping with the French notion of Republicanism, to create, thereby, a system that aids
the integration of immigrants into French society, and to protect and ensure religious
liberty. I will argue that the policy of laicite as applied through French law and statutes
has not only failed to accomplish these objectives, but actually exacerbated the very
problems it set out to resolve by creating discord and division from drawing attention to
particularisms and social, cultural, and ethnic differences, hindering the process of
integration for certain minority groups, arbitrarily establishing and enforcing laws that
discriminate against religious minorities.
I will show that the social and political circumstances in which laicite was
originally conceived were quite different from those that exist in modem France. While
the policy has never been enormously successful - as will be studied in the chapter on the
history of laicite - it is now, more than ever, an antiquated idea that deserves reevaluation

2

in light of democratic principles and the unavoidable reality of an increasingly
multicultural French society. The best way to begin to understand the issues surrounding
Samira’s situation is to study the history of laicite and the purposes for which tliis policy
was created.

3

Laicite: The History ofan Idea

Meaning and translation oflaicite
On the one hundredth anniversary of the 1905 law that separated church and state
in France, a variety of political, social, and cultural circumstances led to a renewed
discussion about one ofthe most fundamental civic ideas in France: the notion of laicite.
Laicite is a term that is difficult for English speakers to understand because it does not
translate easily. It is a complex idea that has deep historical roots in France, but because
it primarily indicates a strict separation between church and state, it is most often and,
●>A

perhaps, most accurately translated into English as “secularism.
In recent years, laicite has been a ubiquitous topic in world newspapers. So much
so, that it has nearly become an Anglicism. It is most often used in reference to the
controversy over the wearing ofthe headscarf(or hijab) in France. The first notable
instance of a headscarf controversy in French schools occurred in 1989, but it was nearly
fourteen years and many student expulsions later before the French government decided
to set up a commission to review the policy of separation between church and state that
formed the legal basis for the expulsions.^ In December 2003,the report of this

^ John Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like the Headscarf: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton
University Press, 2007), 2.
^ Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse. Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in
Contemporary France. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006) 165.
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committee, known as the Stasi Commission, was delivered to the President. It resulted in
the law of 15 march 2004, which prohibited conspicuous symbols of politics or religion
in public schools.
At first glance, this policy might seem harsh and extreme to those from Western
democratic nations with similar separation clauses in their constitutions. Thus, it is
necessary to understand the history behind laicite and the complex relationship between
the church and state throughout France’s history that would lead to such a measure. One
must understand the unique historical events that shaped the French attitude toward
religion in the public sphere to understand why the implementation ofthe French
separation policy is so different from that of other Western democratic nations.

History ofan Idea:Background and Context
The wars ofreligion that occurred throughout the sixteenth century between
Protestants and Catholics set the backdrop for religious strife in France. Toward the end
ofthis period of religious strife came the Edict of Nantes in 1598, which was essentially
the first major political act in favor of religious tolerance. The Edict of Nantes allowed
Protestant Christians to practice their religion openly in France.’
Some eighty-seven years later. King Louis the XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes
with the Edict of Fountainebleu, which led to the subsequent flight ofthe Huguenots
from France. With the Protestant opposition gone and the added support of the king, the
Roman Catholic Church maintained a great stronghold on the French government until

^ Peter L. Berger, The Limits ofSocial Cohesion : Conflict and Mediation in Pluralist Societies(Westview
Press, 1998): 41-42.
^ Rapport au President de la Republique: Commission de Reflexion sur I'application du principe de laicite
dans la Republique(December 2003), p. 10.
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the Revolution in 1789. The entire social structure of France thereafter accommodated
the church. During the Ancien Regime,France was divided into three Estates. The first
represented the Roman Catholic clergy, the second the nobility, and the third the rest of
the people. The first estate had considerable influence over the affairs of the government,
exercised the rights of censorship, and was responsible for collecting tithes and operating
hospitals and schools. In addition, the church owned nearly 15% ofthe land in France.
The clergy was further divided into two groups: the upper and the lower. The upper
clergy began exploiting the common man instead of serving him and became wealtliy.
The French peasants greatly resented this.
In 1789, the French Revolution began, and the people rejected not only the
absolutist regime of King Louis XVI, but also his powerful religious supporters. The
National Assembly disestablished the church, killed or exiled thousands ofthe clergy,
seized the property of the church, and outlawed Catholic religious orders. The new
Republic was so intent on eliminating every vestige ofthe Catholic church that it
instituted a “religion ofthe Republic,” which included ceremonies like the “Festival for
the Goddess Reason” and the adoration of French revolutionary “martyrs” in place ofthe
previous celebrations of saints.^ The Catholic church survived the French Revolution but
lost its possessions to the new Republic, which sold Church land to offset a great deal of
the debt incurred before the Revolution. The state also attempted a tremendous
restructuring of the Church hierarchy that effectively called for submission of the Church
to the state. Clergy were required to swear allegiance to the French government under the

See BBC article: http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A2903663 (Oct. 15, 2004), Retrieved Nov. 20, 2006.
’Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper. Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany.
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), 69.
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Civil Constitution ofthe Clergy promulgated in 1789. Although only 52- 55% actually
10

complied, this act marked the beginning of modern secularism in France.

One additional important result ofthe French Revolution was the development of
The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen,” a list of seventeen rights to
which every citizen was entitled. These rights would become the basic principles upon
which all future French laws and statutes would be based as the National Assembly
firmly believed that all government corruption resulted from a violation of human rights.
One of these principles is mentioned in Article 10 ofthe Declaration:

No-one should be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious, provided
their manifestation does not upset the public order established by law."

This phrase became the first written declaration of religious tolerance in France in the
12

new Republic.

After the Revolution, the Church and State continued to have a tumultuous
relationship. Leaders such as Maximilian Robespierre, who established a Reign of Terror
from September of 1793 until July of 1794 against the Catholic Church and aristocracy,
furthered the hostile relations between the two entities. More pragmatic leaders that
followed Maximilian Robespierre officially established a separation between church and
state in 1795. As a result, the people were once again allowed to practice religion, but
church officials no longer received government funding. The police also maintained

10

Peter L Berger. The Limits ofSocial Cohesion: Conflict and Mediation in Pluralist Societies.(Boulder
Colorado: Westview Press, 1998),42.
Declaration ofthe Rights ofMan and the Citizen., 1789.
12
The word laicite was not used until much later. See BBC article:
httD://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A2903663 (Oct. 15, 2004), Retrieved Nov. 20, 2006, 1.
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surveillance over these religious activities to ensure that they complied with the rules and
13

laws of the new Republic.

Understandably,the Vatican greatly disagreed with the Republic after the
Revolution because of the status ofthe Catholic Church. Then,in 1801, after Napoleon
Bonaparte seized power, he signed a Concordat with Pope Pius VII, which allowed
Catholicism to become the “religion of the great majority of French people,” although not
the established religion. Under the terms ofthis agreement, the Pope gave up former
claims to church property, and Napoleon made allowances for the church to have relative
autonomy in matters of religion, so long as it did not interfere with the rule of law.
Napoleon also agreed to pay the salary of Catholic clergy and bishops if they agreed to
14

swear allegiance to the state.

At the same time,the state also officially recognized

Judaism, and Lutheran and Reformed Churches and gave them ftmding and protection,
but none was given the status ofthe official or established religion. This marks the
beginning of the privatization of religion in France, as religion became a matter of
15

individual conviction.

Although the principle of laicite remained fairly consistently applied throughout
the nineteenth century, many debated the concept toward the latter part ofthe century. In
fact, such a division arose over the issue oflaicite that French scholars such as Emile
Poulat claimed there were “two Frances”: a France of the religious monarchist and a
16

France ofthe atheistic Republican.

In 1881, those of the latter persuasion gained

control of the Assembly and pushed for the secularization of schools. On March 28,

BBC article: http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/lT2ti2/A2903663 (Oct. 15, 2004), Retrieved Nov. 20, 2006, p. 2.
Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper. Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany, 69.
15
BBC article: http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2tz2/A2903663 (Oct. 15, 2004), Retrieved Nov. 20, 2006, p. 2.
16
Emile Poulat dedicated an entire work to this topic: Liberte, laicite: La guerre des deux France et le
principe de la modernite^ Paris, 1987.
14

8

1882, Minister of Public Instruction Jules Ferry passed a law that would laicize public
education. As a result of this law,the Church was no longer allowed to conduct routine
17

inspections of schools and select teachers.

Then,in 1902, Emile Combes sought to shut

down all religious schools and later pushed a law guaranteeing the independence ofthe
state from religion. For his stance on these issues, Pope Pius X referred to him as the
»18

Satanic Monsieur Combes.

Despite the staunch disapproval ofthe Roman Catholic Church,the law of
separation that Emile Combes sought was finally realized in 1905. The concept oflaicite
reached its fully developed form in the Law of9 December 1905, which broke the
Concordat of 1801 forever. Although the government would continue to fund religious
consultants in schools, hospices, asylums and prisons, from that point forward, it would
no longer pay the salaries or expenses incurred by any culte}^ Freedom of religion was
20

now to be restricted in the interest of public order.
The law was a reaction to the anti-Semitism and militarism displayed during the
21

Dreyfus affair.

Alfred Dreyfus was a Jewish captain in the French army who was

wrongly accused oftreason and sentenced to life in prison during a secret military trial in
1894, although the evidence used against the captain was weak. Then in 1896, Lieutenant
Colonel Georges Picquart, an outspoken anti-Semite, became head of military
intelligence. He soon discovered evidence that another individual, Walsin Esterhazy, was
guilty of divulging the secret government information. The lieutenant attempted to save

17

Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper. Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany, 70.
Peter L. Berger, The Limits ofSocial Cohesion, 44.
19
Cultes are defined as religious groups officially recognized by the state, which at that point, included the
four previously mentioned religions ofthe Roman Catholic church, Judaism, the Lutheran church, and the
Reformed Church.
20
Fetzer and Soper. Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany, 70.
21
Ibid, 74.
18

9

the face of the French army by covering Esterhazy’s fault and transferring him to Tunisia,
which worked until Emile Zola, a determined interventionist, wrote an article in a local
paper accusing the army of a cover-up. The government charged Zola with libel, and the
case was reopened because new evidence, which turned out to be forged, had been added
to Dreyfus’ file. At this point, the Catholic Church and political Right railed around the
incident and claimed that this was a conspiracy on the part of the Jews to damage tlie
prestige of the army and thereby destroy France. Dreyfus was again found guilty and
sentenced to ten years detention. Finally, in 1899, the President of France pardoned
Dreyfus, which allowed him to return to Paris, but it was not until 1906 that was he
22

actually exonerated of all the charges and restored to his former military rank.
This scandal struck a chord deep in the hearts ofthe French people. The
outrageous series of events reeked of anti-Semitism and discrimination, and it indicted
individuals who were highly ranked in the French government and military as the scandal
reached all the way to the President. Media coverage ofthe affair reminded the people of
their tumultuous religious history and made them fear a return to the religious strife of
their not-so-distant past. Realizing that something must be done to further separate the
government from religious affairs, the French government began working toward a policy
that would help diminish the possibility of similar events in the future through limiting
the intersection ofthe state and religion. The Law of9 December 1905 was an outgrowth
23

of this effort.

The Law of Separation set forth four fundamental ideas: religion cannot be
supported by the state, politically or financially; every citizen has the right to follow a

22
23

See Michael Burns. France and the Dreyfus Affair: A Documentary History(Palgrave Macmillan, 1998).
Peter McPhee, A Social History ofFrance, 1789- 1914(Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 257.
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religion, but no one has an obligation to do so; religious education at school is strictly
forbidden, and; no new religious symbols could be placed in public spaces. Although the
terms of the law seem quite rigid and prohibitive, it actually maintained that citizens still
had the same right to practice their religion in public as in private so long as they did not
24

disturb public order.

The problem with this notion is that it left a great deal offreedom

to the local courts and justice system to determine just which acts “disturbed the public
order.
Throughout much of the twentieth century, laicite remained unchallenged. In
1940, however, it was repealed during the Vichy regime. In coordination with the
Catholic Church, Marshall Petain, head of the French state under the Third Reich,
enacted several changes that contradicted the French policy of separation that was set in
place in December of 1905. Some of these changes included the reintroduction of
teaching “duty toward God” in public schools in December of 1940,the return of
religious buildings and property to the Catholic Church including the caves of Lourdes in
February of 1941, and the public subsidizing of private Catholic schools as of November
1941

Many of the changes made during the Vichy regime lingered for a long time

after the regime was abolished and some remain even today.
Laicite was later restored by Charles de Gaulle in the Fifth Republic, but the
debate over the implications of laicite resurfaced in the 1970s due to the increase in
Maghrebi immigration.^*’ The first generation of North African immigrants to France
came in order to fill the labor shortage ofthe 1960s. They came on work visas and did

24

BBC article; http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A2903663(Oct. 15, 2004), Retrieved Nov. 20, 2006, 2.
See website of the International Humanist and Ethical Union: http://www.iheu.org/node/1969. Retrieved
March 5, 2007.
26
BBC article: http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna,^h2g2/A2903663 (Oct. 15, 2004), Retrieved Nov. 20, 2006, 2.

25
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not possess French citizenship; the French viewed their stay as temporary. These
Maghrebi workers were seen as guests who would return to their country of origin when
there was no longer a need for their services. This attitude led to the relegation of the
immigrants to the outer portions ofthe large cities where they had easier access to their
work in mines or factories. As a result, the immigrant communities retained much of their
native culture and language and did not assimilate to French culture. This only became a
problem when the French began to see that their residence was not temporary. A second
and third generation of North African Arab immigrants came of age in the banlieues of
French cities with little knowledge of French culture and little desire to assimilate.
In the late 1980’s, the attention ofthe French was abruptly turned to Idicite once
again when a few young Muslims chose not to remove their headscarves in their public
schools. This incident was left in the hands of the local courts, but was widely
publicized. Over the next several decades similar incidents occurred all over France until
President Chirac decided that the affair deserved state attention and requested a
27

commission in July of2003 to evaluate the state ofIdicite in France, This evaluation
was embodied in what is known as the Stasi Commission report, which initiated
contemporary discussions on the application ofIdicite.

Two Views ofLdicite
Modem interpretations of Idicite fall into one oftwo general categories: “strict”
or soft.” A “strict” interpretation of Idicite holds that people may believe whatever they
choose in their private life, and that religious faith is a private matter. The state should
not be concerned with such matters. When one enters the public sphere, however.
27

BBC article: http://\vww.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A2903663 (Oct. 15, 2004), Retrieved Nov. 20, 2006, 3.
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whether in work or in public schools, he or she is obliged to leave any exterior
manifestations of religion behind. Engaging in religious activities such as prayer and
fasting should be prohibited along with the wearing of any distinctly religious clothing or
28

jewelry.
A “soft” interpretation of laicite, on the other hand, maintains that the state should
respect various religious beliefs and encourage the free exercise of religion and religious
expression in the public sector. The “soft” interpretation of laicite contends that
witnessing religious activities is beneficial to the public because it opens dialogue and
fosters understanding. The “soft” interpretation oflaicite argues that religious liberty
includes the “right to express and indicate religious beliefs within educational
institutions” as long as students “respect pluralism and the liberty of others.” True laicite
is not hostile to faith because it promotes tolerance and respects the peaceful practice of
29

religion in the public sphere.

Laicite and the Privatization ofReligion
The “strict” interpretation oflaicite is arguably the one most often taken by the
French government. What this interpretation oflaicite has essentially done is to privatize
religion. A belief in the idea of a secular state that refuses multiculturalism is only
possible if one maintains that religion is capable of being categorized or
compartmentalized in the minds and lives offollowers. While this may once have been
possible in the early days of the Republic when France was relatively homogenous and
striving for unity among small differences of religious sects from a similar Judeo-

Fetzer and Soper. Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany, 73.
Ibid, 74.
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Christian background, it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep all religious groups
relegated to the private sphere as the advent of globalization has led to increasing
fundamentalism among traditional religious groups and increasing permeation of nonWestern religions into Western society.
Although North African Muslim immigrants began arriving in France as early as
the mid-1950’s to fill labor shortages, their presence and religious affiliation did not
present a serious problem for French until the advent of globalization and radical Islam.
Globalization is one of the primary causes of the growing presence of fundamentalist
groups, which are inherently at odds with a strict notion of laicite because they often
promulgate a strict adherence to religious rituals which overflow into the public sphere.
Globalization contributes to the rise offundamentalism by increasing contact between
different cultures and philosophies. This initially causes a trend toward neutralization of
religion. In reaction to this neutralization or diluting of religion, there is a subsequent
countermovement offundamentalism. Traditional, conservative members of a particular
faith fear the increasing neutralization of their religion and revert to fundamental, literal
interpretations of sacred texts as the solution for unity in the faith which transcends
30

national borders.

Because ofthis trend toward fundamentalism, Jose Casanova in his book Modern
Religions in the Public World asserts that religion is becoming more and more of a key
player in public life and should therefore play a key role in public policy. He charts a
twentieth-century movement of Western, democratic governments toward secularization
and a parallel movement toward privatization of religion. He argues, however, that since

30

See Anthony Giddens. Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives.(New York,
Routledge, 2003); 48-50.
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the 1980s, we have experienced what he calls a “deprivatization” of religion or a refusal
on the part of several fundamental religious groups to accept relegation to the private
sphere. Casanova asserts that not only is religion something that is here to stay, but it
does and will continue to play a vital role in society. The question is then turned toward
Western governments as to how they will adapt policy to accommodate religion. The
argument of the “deprivatization” of religion leads one to reevaluate the validity of older
secularity clauses, such as that of laicite, which attempt to sequester religion to the
31

private sphere and diminish its importance in the lives of citizens.

Laicite as a Tool
Since the inception of laicite, a portion of the French population has considered
the policy to be a sort of Trojan horse for anti-clerical militants’ campaign to rid the
French state of all remnants of traditional religion. The Roman Catholic Church
32 *~r^

denounced the secular school policy in 1886 calling it the “atheisation” of the state.

The

Catholic Church, however, does not stand alone in these sentiments.
Joel Fetzer and Christopher Soper, authors of Muslims and the State in Britain,
France, and Germany,interviewed a French Muslim schoolteacher, Abdellatif Hmito,
who believes that those who push laicite often do so “on the pretext that they want to
defend the Republic, defend laicite, while actually defending the fact that they are, most
of the time, atheists or agnostics or the people who won the battle against the Catholic
,,33

Church.

3t

Jos6 Casanova. Public Religions in the Modern IKorW(University of Chicago Press, 1994): 3-10.
Fetzer and Soper. Muslims and the State in Britain. France, and Germany, 70.
33
Ibid, 71.

32
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Fetzer and Soper conducted a similar interview with French novelist and literary
critic Louis Martinez, who says that French “secularism or laicite in France is related to
powerful, atheistic or anti-Christian propaganda. . ..Pure laicite does not exist. There’s
04

always a polemical position behind it... in general, an anti-Christian [one].’

A study of the statements and lives ofthe founders of laicite make it easy to
assume that their intentions were anticlerical. Jules Ferry, who was, politically-speaking.
relatively moderate, claimed that his project of secularizing schools was a means of
,05

organizing humanity without God and without a king.

While Ferry tended toward

agnosticism, Edgar Quinet was an outspoken atheist, Emile Combes attended a Catholic
seminary and then became a “fervent spiritualist,” Felix Pecaut and Jules Steeg were
liberal Protestant pastors, and Ferdinand Buisson became a rationalist later in life, even
36

though he had been raised by devout evangelical Protestants.

Conclusion
The tumultuous religious history of France led to the creation of a unique concept
of separation between the French state and the church. Each step in the evolution of the
concept of laicite came as a negative reaction against a religiously-inflated event. This is
clearly seen in the specific wording of Article 10 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Citizen, which uses the qualifying word “even” before referring to religion as an
opinion that could not be disturbed by the state unless it upset public order. This is
indicative of the reaction ofthe people against the abuses of the Catholic Church under
the monarchy. Next, it is visible in the Law of9 December 1905, which came at the end
34

Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper. Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany, 11.
See Le Tourneau in Fetzer and Soper. Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany, 11.
36
Ibid.

35
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of the Dreyfus Affair, an awful example of the deeply rooted religious prejudice and
discrimination that infiltrated high levels ofthe French government and military. Then
again, the state’s polarized reaction is obvious in the controversy over the Muslim hijab
in schools and the resulting ban on all ostentatious signs of religion in schools.
Wliile there are differing viewpoints on the interpretation of laicite, the
government’s frequently “strict” interpretation indicates a belief in the privatization of
religion, which certain scholars such as Jose Casanova say is neither possible nor
desirable. Individuals from greatly varied backgrounds view modem and historical
laicite as inherently anti-clerical.
While it is possible to argue that laicite has never been tmly effective based on
these examples throughout the history of its application, it is certainly becoming more
and more difficult to argue for a strictly privatized religion with the advent of
globalization and the resulting spread of multiculturalism and fundamentalism.

17

Republicanism and Laicite: Unity in the French State

Introduction
Republicanism is an idea at the very heart of French identity and one that is
integral to a solid understanding of laicite. The term. Republicanism, simply refers to the
French ideals that emerged from the Revolution of 1789. The notions of liberte, egalite,
et fraternite had strong effects on the politics of governance in the post-revolutionary
Republic. The leaders of the new state believed that the people could be freely governed
because they held a set of common values and interests. Since the Revolution, the state
has strived to govern the public realm based on a common understanding of these basic
values and interests.
One of the primary reasons laicite exists is to uphold the Republican ideal of
liberty by protecting the freedom of religion. Religion, even at the time of the revolution,
had already proven to be an element of French society that was not held in common by
all the people. As a result, it caused a great deal of strife and discord. Laicite was
established to separate religion from the public sphere, so that when a citizen entered the
public realm he or she sensed only unity among other citizens. Republicanism asks that
the individual set off ethnic, social, or religious particularisms that might cause
dissension among fellow citizens of the Republic.
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It is essential to understand the relationship between Republicanism and laicite in
order to understand the ways in which the state attempts to create unity through this
policy of separation between church and state.

The Unique Relationship between Laicite and Republicanism
Conflict with the Roman Catholic Church led to the initial formulation of an idea
of separation between church and state that has now become one of the most central
principles of the French Republican state. The concept of laicite is a constitutional
principle that proffers the notion of a secular ethic, a universal set of morals that exists
independently of religion. It is grounded in Enlightenment and Revolutionary ideals of
science and philosophy, and acts as a civil and social bond that provides a means of
educating the citizen. Laicite has, thus, become one of the primary unifying tools of the
state.
The rational concept of democracy and this deeply rooted notion of secularity
provide the foundation for a latent fear of particularisms. It was the notion of unity and
commonality stemming from Republican ideology that became the impetus for the
“internal colonialism” of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when fear of differences,
even as minute as linguistic and cultural particularisms, became elements that should be
eradicated in favor of unity. Breton, Corsican, and Occitan were all seen as particularisms
that needed to be eliminated in order to promote unity. The Rapport de la Commission de
la nationalite maintained that the school of the Third Republic was responsible for
ensuring the transformation of young Bretons, Corsicans, and Proven9als, the children of
Italian and Polish miners, the children of the Jewish proletariat of central Europe, into

19

citizens of the Republic speaking the same language and sharing the same cultural and
37

patriotic values.

The primary means of eliminating these particularisms and unifying the state was
through education. After the Jules Ferry laws of the 1880s, progress toward a secular
education system remained slow but was increasingly focused upon educating good
citizens who would become future defenders of the Republic rather than instructing
students to become religious and morally upstanding. In 1923, the reference to teaching
“duties towards God” was finally dropped from the program of civic instruction, which
38

officially made state education non-religious.

Yves Deloye declares in Ecole et
39

citoyennete that the school is the principal site of individual emancipation,

It is there

that the student puts off all cultural, religious, and ethnic particularisms in order to learn
the principles of liberty,justice, toleration, and progress.
The public school system has long been a socializing agent that strives to create
model French citizens who are prepared to participate in French public life and become
upstanding republicans. Teachers played a tremendous role in secularization during the
latter part of the nineteenth century and the first few decades of the twentieth century by
battling against the church’s hold on the minds of French youth. This was necessary to
diminish the importance of religion and thereby diminish the violent divisions religion
had brought to France. The whole of French history is a testament to the strife that
religious differences bring. Consequently, the state sees fit to regulate religion and
control its influence in the public sphere.
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After 1905, the French state took several measures to separate itself from the
church, but it maintained official recognition of certain cultes. While “religion” has to do
with the relationship of the individual to God, the *'culte'’‘ is the outward expression of
that religion.

The state defines cultes as possessing celebration or group meetings

(catholic mass); designated buildings (churches or synagogues), and teaching of certain
principles.

The limited freedoms of the cultes protect against the reemergence of

religious conflict and maintain public order. Incidentally, the purpose of such state
control of religion is to safeguard public order and protect the freedom of the individual.
For this reason, the French state continuously redefines, regulates, and oversees the
40

activities of religious leaders and religious groups.
Several religious groups have been denied official recognition by the French state
because of stances on issues would make them incompliant with French laws or that
would threaten public order. For example, the state has only recently recognized
Jehovah’s Witnesses after they were rejected multiple times on the basis of their active
proselytizing and refusal to accept blood transfusions.'^* Islam presents a similar threat
because of public ritual practices like veil-wearing, sacrifices, and prostrations in exotic
42

buildings.

The republican concept of regulations has great implications not only for

France’s education policies but also for its immigration policies. France has been very
welcoming to immigrant populations as long as they take on the common values and
43

behaviors that indicate they are French.
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France has continually used education to inculcate in immigrant groups the ideas
of Republican and civic virtue. An elaborate system of education emphasizing
Republican ideals for the purpose of unifying citizens became necessary in large part
because of the tremendous number of immigrants that France continued to invite from
Northern and central Europe and most recently from the former colonies in the Maghreb,
former North African colonies, as it lacked the labor force to fill its factories and mines
44

and the military numbers to defend itself following the Second World War.

With time, however, this idea has become less and less viable. The Republican
education ideals hereto set forth have proven inadequate to stave off crime, especially
among the youth, which diminishes respect for the republican civisme, or civic
mindedness. It has also proven ineffective at providing economic opportunity, as is seen
in the rising unemployment rates. Education no longer opens the road to social or
economic advancement. As a result, these hollow ideals have begun to look more like a
45

philosophy of European ethnocentrism.

Impact ofRepublicanism on Immigrant Communities
As part of its efforts to unify the nation, the French state has developed universal.
Republican ideals that theoretically could be adopted by anyone who wished to join the
French political community. The difficulty comes in asking devout members of a strict,
legalistic religious group or other organization to set aside the particularisms of group
membership to become an “individual” in the eyes of the state. French law asks the
individual to sacrifice one set of particularisms, those of an ethnic, cultural, or religious
44
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community, for another, albeit a larger all encompassing one, that of the French state as
defined by the Republican virtues.
This serves to deemphasize the importance of cultural, ethnic, or religious group
belonging in favor of universal human belonging in the French state. In his work
Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France Jeremy
Jennings describes inclusion in French society in this way:

Transmuted into the patrie of revolutionary liberty, France becomes the location
of a conception of citizenship tied to a specific culture (including a cuisine) and a
specific national past. To be a citizen is first and foremost to be French,to share a
common inheritance and patrimony, to feel rooted in a familial and spatial
context.'*^

A sense of solidarity and civic pride are natural outflows of this idea. This also
helps explain French citizens’ fear of fragmentation and a growing ambiguity about
national identity as what was traditionally thought French is challenged on a daily basis
when one enters the streets or marketplace and sees a myriad of different cultures
represented in food, clothing, and activities. This fear of losing a national identity often
coexists with a concern about immigration and raises the question of whether the
47

immigrants have become adequately integrated.

The Essence ofRepublicanism
Republicanism’s claims of popular democracy and sovereignty tout such notions
as greater social justice and civic equality. A distinctive sense of what it means to be a
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part of the French political community and nation are a logical outgrowth of these
ideas.48
At this point, it proves useful to refer to the notions ofjus sanguinis andjus solis.
To the French, one obtains citizenship and the right to be called French not on the basis
of one’s birth or blood heritage (jus sanguinis), but on the basis of one’s political
convictions and willingness to adopt a set of common values (jus solis). Consequently,
Republicanism carries with it a certain tendency toward universalism that is often set in
stark contrast to modem democratic ideas of multiculturalism and pluralism. At its base,
the notion of Republicanism maintains that there is one universal element, the human
subject. Nowhere in the notion of Republicanism is deference given to race or ethnicity
as requirements for joining the political community. Common elements combine to create
the French citizen. These elements include a shared language, culture, and desire to
participate in a common economic and political life. It is necessary to enter the political
community dressed simply and solely in the garb of an individual citizen divested of all
particularistic affiliations.^® The French state claims that anyone can be taught and can
adopt these elements to become a member ofthe national political commtmity.

Laicite: A Defense ofReligious Freedom
As laicite was designed to safeguard religious freedom, its intent was purportedly
to defend pluralism, not to threaten it. In essence, the French state privatized religion
under laicite for the purpose of defending the freedom of religion because numerous wars
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and conflicts over religion in France proved it was a divisive issue that was best kept
personal and private.
In the first article of the French constitution of 4 October 1958, one finds the
99

statement that “France respects all beliefs.

Then again in the tenth article of the

Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, the principle of religious freedom is clearly
set forth: “no one may be disturbed for his opinions, even religious ones, so long as their
expression does not trouble public order as established by the law.” Thus, it is clear that a
healthy respect for religious freedom is present in fundamental French political
documents. Deriving its role from these documents, the state sees its duty as twofold:
relegating religion strictly to the private sphere and regulating its entry into the public
sphere. The interpretation and application of this notion of religious freedom, however, is
51

quite different from the American concept ofsuch freedoms.

Westerners, Americans in particular, tend to think of secularization in terms of
99

“freedom to,” while the French notion of laicite is based more on a “freedom from

concept. This is to say that most American rights are granted to provide opportunity to
individuals. Americans have the freedom to express religion, the right to bear arms, and
the freedom of speech. Americans hold dear their right to bring into the public sphere
that which they believe so deeply in private, whereas the French hold dear their freedom
from the inundation of other religions in the public realm.

Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse. Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in
Contemporary France, 140.
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Conclusion
The state is responsible for the interpretation and application of the principles of
laicite. It, thereby, takes upon itself the responsibility of establishing, educating, and
ensuring that common Republican values and interests are upheld by its citizens. This is
accomplished primarily through education. The notion of Republicanism in France
provides the foundation for the policy of laicite and has great implications for several
different aspects of French society. Laicite was designed to be a bulwark protecting
religious freedom but French policy based on Republican ideals has turned out to be
discriminatory and prohibitive as will be seen in the headscarf controversy.
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Laicite and Immigration: the French Policy ofAssimilation
Introduction
Republican notions of unity among citizens contain strong implications for
immigration policies and immigrant communities. The value placed on unity creates a
natural priority of effective assimilation of immigrant populations. Thus, an important
goal of laicite is to aid the process of immigration to France by making cultural and
religious differences a non-issue in the public sphere. Wliile laicite is supposed to ease
this transition for immigrants, it has actually become a greater hindrance than aid.

Definition and Differences
The French word integrer holds much the same meaning as the English word
“integrate,”* which involves a combination or incorporation of new ideas. Integration
implies a relationship between two different entities where the two groups compromise
and a new whole is developed as an aggregate of the two. It involves the coordination of
two separate elements to form a unified whole.
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There is no necessary or implied loss

of the individual characteristics of either of the original two groups, but rather a
complimentary relationship created out of differences.
Assimilation, on the other hand, is the process by which a group of individuals
acquire the social and psychological characteristics of another group. The French word
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assimiler means “to absorb or to make similar.”^^ Assimilation implies the alteration of
social and cultural norms by the foreign community in order to harmonize with the
54

culture and traditions of the national community.

Difficulties that arise with immigration
Different nations employ different means and take different stands on integration
or assimilation. The viewpoint of a nation toward immigration is heavily based on the
nation s particular perspective on the rights of citizenship. Two common distinctions are
often made about the ideas of citizenship: jus solis citizenship and Jus sanguinis
citizenship. These terms originate from two Latin words that mean “right of birth” and
“right of blood,” respectively, and they reflect the different notions of national identity.
Although it seems easier to adopt the culture and values of a community as is the
policy of the French 7

solis, for some communities with very strict rules and rituals at

the heart of their identity, it is as difficult for them to sacrifice these ideals as to change
their blood lineage. For this reason, many French debate the possibility of ever truly
incorporating Muslims into French society. The problems encountered with a Muslim
immigrant community are quite different from those encountered with another JudeoChristian heritage community such as the Jews or the earlier French conflicts between
Catholics and Protestants. This immigrant Muslim population presents a very visible
difference in France with the wearing of the veil and also by the dark skin and hair of
North African immigrants. Numbers are also an important complicating factor in the
question of immigration. France must contend with a Muslim population that makes up
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10% of their total according to the U.S. Department of State in 2006.

As a result, the

French state must grapple with such issues as multiculturalism versus pluralism, group
differentiated rights versus individual rights, jus sanguinis versus jus solis citizenship,
and many other mediating views between these opposing ideas.

Multiculturalism in France
Michael Walzer makes a distinction between several different types of “regimes
of toleration”.

These

include

multinational

empires, international

consociations, nation-states, and immigrant societies,

societies.

Each of these institutions has

policies and organizations in place to create environments conducive to toleration of
cultural, ethnic, and religious differences.^^ France becomes a sort of complicated mix of
these categories, a unique case because it is a ‘classic nation-state’ with Europe’s greatest
immigrant population. Walzer analyzes France’s migrant history and concludes, “Far
more than any other country, France has been a society of immigrants. And yet it isn’t a
pluralist society - or at least it doesn’t think of itself, and isn’t thought of as a pluralist
,,57

society.

In many ways, France has sought to be a mono-cultural society.

However, with the rise of the National Front, a far right party, and its stance on
immigration along with economic hardships of rising unemployment rates, the issue of
immigration has become a popular topic of discussion in political and social circles. It is
a simple fact that France has an economic and culturally diverse population. In recent
years, the majority of immigrants have come from North Africa. It is no wonder, then.
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that much attention has been drawn to the specifically Arab immigrant communities.
Questions have been posed as to the possibility of incorporating these groups under the
58

current policies of the Republic.

Arguments against multiculturalism in France are many. The defenders of
traditional Republicanism see multiculturalism as

a new form of tribalism.

Alain

Finkielkraut speaking before the Commission de la Nationalite said:

I believe that the fanatics of cultural identity, those who raise collective
difference to the level of an absolute, do not proceed differently from racists,
even if to be accurate the determinism within which they enclose individuals is
not genetic but rather historical or traditional.

Multiculturalism thereby becomes associated with the far right because traditional
conservatism of the far right is associated with nationalism and a desire to separate from
the “others.

The tribalism and the factions it creates leads to the very xenophobic
99

ideologies that the French have tried to avoid. It leads to violent “Balkanization
64

or

„60

Lebanization.

Even affirmative action policies that are created to ease the situation

and equalize the different groups are said to result in division and inevitable political
61

correctness that result from a tyranny of the minority,

The French view this as a sort of

reverse discrimination that is as intolerable as any other form of discrimination.
The French see multiculturalism as leading to the breakdown of the heart of
French Republicanism, which is unity among citizens. It leads to a systematic denial of
responsibility when one considers oneself primarily as a member of a group and leads to
58
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a fear of mixite or intermingling between groups. Multiculturalism is thereby un-French
because it condones unequal rights and sanctions communities closed in upon
themselves. It places culture above politics, groups above individuals.
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Group Rights versus Individual Rights
The French also view the multicultural model as flawed because it is based on
recognition of group rights. Liberal democracy recognizes all citizens as equal imder the
law as individuals not as members of a particular group. This is important because not all
groups respect individual rights. For this reason, Francis Fukuyama asserts that group
rights cannot always be respected in a modem,liberal democracy:

The old multicultural model was a failure in such countries as the Netherlands and
Britain, and it needs to be replaced by more energetic efforts to integrate nonWestern populations into a common liberal culture. The old multicultural model was
based on group recognition and group rights. Out of a misplaced sense of respect for
cultural differences, it ceded entirely too much authority to cultural communities to
define rules of behavior for their own members. Liberalism cannot ultimately be
based on group rights, because not all groups uphold liberal values. The civilization
of the European Enlightenment, of which contemporary liberal democracy is the heir,
cannot be culturally neutral, since liberal societies have their own values regarding
the equal worth and dignity of individuals. Cultures that do not accept these basic
premises do not deserve equal protection in a modern liberal democracy. Members of
immigrant communities and their offspring deserve to be treated equally as
individuals, not as members of cultural communities. Thus, there is no reason for a
Muslim girl to be treated differently under the law from a Christian or Jewish one,
whatever the feelings of her relatives.^^

The principle of religious toleration asserts that religion should not be pursued in
the public sphere in a way that compromises the religious freedoms of other individuals.
This modern liberal notion of separation of church and state has never been fully realized
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in France because it effectively communicated the idea that the state should not impose
religion on individuals, but it has left unanswered the question of the extent to which
64

individuals had the right to exercise their religious convictions in the public sphere.

Naturally, other questions have been raised about the extent to which group rights
should be recognized in a liberal democracy. France claims that the state cannot
recognize group rights under any conditions because there are those groups who do not
respect the rights of individuals that are granted by the state.

Muslims are currently

making demands of the state for group rights in accordance v^th their religious tenets that
do not coincide with the individual liberties of the citizen in France. They have requested
exemption from the family law that applies to everyone else in the state, the right to
exclude non-Muslims from events, and the right to state support of religious schools. In
some cases, Muslim communities have even pushed for a change in the nature of the
public order as a whole. These concepts clearly overstep the boundaries of the
individual’s right to practice religion in the public sphere because they infringe on the
65

rights of other individuals.

Changing Face ofImmigrant Populations in France
In general, the task of unifying and incorporating immigrant populations has
become more difficult over the years, but a recent focus has been placed on the changing
face of the immigrant population in France. The French are very aware that a sizable
population from the former North African colonies has brought a large Islamic following
to France. With an estimated 5 to 6 million Muslims in France, Islam is now the second

64
65

Ibid, 7.
Fukuyama,“Identity, Imigration and Democracy,” 16.

32

most practiced religion. The economic and educational disparity between these
immigrant populations and the French has led to a “ghettoization” of the immigrant
populations in the banlieues of France’s larger cities. This division coupled with
economic hardship has produced a generation that feels excluded. The second and third
generation immigrants do not feel fully French, nor do they relate to the culture and
homeland to which the first generation often remains tied. This exclusion results in an
appeal for universal values that unite. Second and third generation immigrants in France
are more drawn to radical Islam because it provides a universal set of values and beliefs
of which they can be a pent.
The rise of radical Islam among the youth of France has led to a strong reaction
against Islam amongst the French. They feel that it is even more essential now that the
values of integration are pushed on this community because it is necessary for the Islamic
community to accept the rules and laws of the republic and above all, secular state in
66

order for them to become a part of French social and political life,

The French state

questions the very possibility of Muslim integration because of such practices as
polygamy, inequality between the sexes, and arranged marriages. It describes these
practices and values as incompatible with French Vcilues.
At the same time that such extreme differences are noted between the Arab
immigrant population and other former immigrant populations, the French staunchly
maintain that no special concessions should be made to accommodate the group. They
should be required to integrate in the same manner as all other immigrant populations.
The French state cannot afford to give special rights or privileges to certain groups. This
goes back to the notion of‘group rights’ verses ‘individual rights.’ France claims to have
66
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never given special rights to minority groups. All citizens, men or v^omen, native or
67

foreign-bom, are equal, as individuals, before the law.

Summary ofthe Republican Notion ofImmigration
There are four basic principles that can summarize the Republican stance on
immigration. First, immigrants must integrate with respect for the secular (laic) nature of
the state, which tolerates differing philosophical and religious beliefs but refuses to grant
special privileges. Second, it is the responsibility of the individual, not the group, to
integrate, and no special concession will be made to accommodate a specific community.
Third, immigrant populations must respect the law of the French state. In return, the state
will respect their culture, religion, and tradition. Finally, immigrants are to be treated as
equals with French citizens. No policies will be made favoring immigrants (as with
American

affirmative action

policies), but rather to integrate all and aid in collective

68

cohesion.

The French state is a complex mix of ideas between the state and the individual.
On the one hand, there are those elements of the French immigration policy that would
lead one to believe that they are perhaps more individualistic than other more
multicultural nations. On the other hand, the universal principles and values which the
French Republic espouses lead one to believe they are group oriented to the highest
degree, to the point that every citizen of the nation must adhere to the same set of values
and principles. The latter idea creates a tremendous hardship for certain religious
populations that find themselves unable to sacrifice fundamental aspects of their identity
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as founded on their religious convictions, which the French deem in conflict with laicite
and Republican values.

35

Laicite and Islam: Can one be Muslim and French?

Introduction

The largest minority population in France that is currently experiencing hardships
and discrimination under laic policies is the Muslim population. While this minority
group shares a great deal of similarity with other minority groups of France’s past, there
are several differences that make this population worth studying before exploring a
specific case. Some of the factors that set the French Islamic minority apart from others
are: 1) the complexity of the religion and the specific tenets ofthe faith that result in an
interesting relationship with the state; 2)the unique relationship France has with its
former colonies, largely of Muslim influence, that shapes the opinions of many French
people toward a large percentage ofthe Muslim population, and; 3)the Muslim
community’s tendency to resist assimilation.
Among all European countries, France has the greatest number of inhabitants
from Muslim origins, with an estimated 5-6 million Muslims living in France,69 The
numbers are difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty because statistics are only
taken on the basis of ethnic and sectarian backgrounds, not religion, because the law of9
December 1905 that separated the church and state in France strictly prohibits questions
about religious affiliation. The problem in determining the number of“practicing”
Muslims is further complicated by the fact that “muslimness” is not a clearly defined
69
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idea. How should one define Muslim? Should it be based on the level of observance of
Islamic rules and rituals or should it be based more nearly on social and cultural identity?
Even within each of these categories, there is a great deal of variance. The level of ritual
observance differs from sect to sect and region to region. As result, much more reliance is
placed, by default, upon tlie cultural criteria than on religious observance because it is
70

easier to chart.

Ethnic Origins and Ideological Diversity
The Muslim community is distributed in a very uneven and concentrated pattern
largely around the bigger cities and their suburbs. For the most part, the communities are
in poorer, densely populated neighborhoods often on the outskirts ofthe city, which has
created a Muslim “ghetto” ofsorts.''' The largest three areas of population are around
Paris, where 38% of France’s Muslim community reside, near Provence-Alpes-Cote
d’Azur which accounts for 13% ofthe Muslim population, and finally the Rhone-Alpes
which accounts for 10% ofthe French Muslim population. Other noteworthy
72

communities are in the northern region close to Calais(5 %).

An important factor to note in the composition ofthe Muslim minority in France
is ethnic origins. The vast majority of French Muslims are of Sunni, Maghrebi descent.
Roughly, 37% ofthem are Algerian, 24% are Moroccan, and about 8% are Tunisian.’^
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Along with religion, these ethnic and cultural backgrounds bring other socially significant
74

factors such as a low average age and high birthrate.

Islam is a religion that is highly diversified and given to the development of
tradition. Thus, the different cultural and ethnic backgrounds ofthe Arab immigrant
populations have led to a diverse ideological climate among Muslims in France. While
most French Muslims follow a quietist, traditional Islam that has adapted to the French
legal and political environment and prefers the individual observance ofthe basic tenets
of the faith, there are those members of sects of Islam in France that take a much more
75

activist or radical approach to Islam.

The major followings of Islam in France can be divided into four groups: secular
Muslims, conservatives, fundamentalists, and Islamists. Secular Muslims practice a
strictly secular ideology with nearly antireligious undertones. They are advocates of
Westernization and modernization who promote an intellectual and cultural revival of
Islam that would allow the religion to adapt to a contemporary, global society.
Conservatives, who are in the clear majority in France, advocate the following of
religious rituals and observances within the framework of republican laws. They are often
open to new laws but are opposed to any radical reinterpretation ofIslamic principles and
laws that might threaten the unity of Sunni Islam throughout the world. Fundamentalist
Muslims are those who insist upon the strict observance of all religious prescriptions
according to the Qur’an, Surma, and Hadith by both Muslims and non-Muslims. The
principles set forth in the sacred texts are not open to reinterpretation or change.
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Fundamentalists adhere to very strict rules and regulations within the faith that often
make assimilation into broader society very difficult.
Islamists are distinguished from the former group principally by their political
ambitions. They do not stop at believing in the strict adherence to fundamental principles
set out in the sacred texts of Islam, but rather, they advocate a society-wide revolution
toward a government run on these principles. Although this movement remains small
among Muslims in France, it is a growing segment ofthe faith. It appeals to second or
third generation Muslim young people who feel frustrated by the exclusion from the
76

society of their home country and feel no connection with their country of descent.

Social and Economic Conditions among French Muslims
The immigrant Muslim community in France is not only ethnically and
ideologically diverse, but socially and economically unequal. First generation
immigrants were often poor and illiterate. The came largely to work in mines or factories
and had no real use for high levels of education. As time passed and families became a
more permanent part of French culture, second and third generation immigrants became
more integrated into the French educational system. Inherited economic disadvantages,
however, play a large role in drop-out rates among Muslim youth.’^
The rate of unemployment among minority immigrant communities remains
significantly higher that the national average at roughly double in larger cities. In the fall
of 2000,the rate of unemployment in Marseilles was at 20 percent overall and 50 percent
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among the Muslim population/^ There is also a strong presence of discrimination against
these minority populations, which makes it difficult for them to obtain jobs even if they
do manage to finish high school or earn a degree. Thus, among those who are employed,
most are in unskilled or low-paying jobs.
This provides a clear example ofthe ineffectiveness ofthe “color blind” policy of
French universalism. Although Republican values assert the equality of all individuals,
this does not always result in well-implemented policies securing such equality. For
example, French job applications require a picture, thus, facilitating the ability of an
employer to readily identify ethnicity, age, and gender. Furthermore, there is no system
of accountability for employers who discriminate on the basis of racial differences as
indicated by a name or picture on a job application. This provides an important context
for understanding how discrimination can lead to the desperation that creates a climate of
violence.

Cultural Climate and Violence
Jocelyne Cesari, author of Ethnicity, Islam, and les banlieues: Confusing the
Issues, states that the social exclusion that led to economic depression ofimmigrant
populations in the banlieues created a cycle of continued discrimination and exclusion. In
79

the 1970’s, the HLMs(Habitation a Loyer Modere) were distributed to individuals by
the HLM administration and accommodated people as they arrived. Naturally, waves of
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immigration from specific areas throughout the world led to segregation and organization
of different ethnic groups in the HLM communities. “Les Fran9ais de Souche”(naturalbom French citizens) who had previously inhabited the HLMs left because they no longer
wanted to live alongside immigrants. Consequently, the HLMs became a trap for working
class immigrant families without the economic means to leave. Even if they acquired the
financial means to leave, they often could not find a new place to live because ofthe
extreme racial, etlinic, and cultural discrimination.
Thus, the HLM communities became increasing homogenous and “ghettoized.”
Academic failure, delinquency, drug use, and unemployment became rampant.
Marginalization and relegation are two terms that have been used with increasing
frequency to describe the situation ofthe immigrants in the banlieues. The HLM
communities became hopeless dormitory towns set apart from the French urban scene.
Members of the younger generation, although they had little connection with the
cultures of their Arab or Algerian parents, were constantly reminded oftheir background
through the stigma they experience in their daily interactions. They became victims of
“post-colonial syndrome.” Muslim or Arab background became a symbol colored by all
the negative images of the decades of colonialism. Cultural inequality made the social
marginalization worse and led to institutionalized discrimination in housing,
employment, education, and political representation.
On a regular basis, the French refer to the immigrant youth ofthe banlieues as a
threat. The riots of the 1980’s along with the bombings ofthe Paris metro in December
1995, the gang fights on the Champs-Elysees in November of 2004, and the riots in the
banlieues in the fall of 2005 are all natural results ofthe stigmatization and relegation
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experienced by the members of this marginalized community. These incidents are
physical representations oftheir angst and their assertion of their identity. They feel like
the French have attempted to ignore their presence by relegating them to the periphery of
cities. These acts of violence are intended to demonstrate that they will no longer be
80

repressed or ignored.

This same attitude and assertion of identity is seen in the headscarf controversy
that arose in the late 1980’s and continues through the early part ofthe 2000s. Wliere the
majority of these oppressed men asserted their presence and identity through violence and
rioting, the women chose to demonstrate and assert their identity through the symbolism
of the veil.
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Laicite in Practice: The HeadscarfBan
Introduction
The issue of laicite has become an increasingly controversial topic in France over
the last few decades, particularly for a small population of Muslim girls who want to
wear a veil or head covering Qiijab) to school. One might ask what it is about a piece of
cloth that so incites the anger and passions of school administrators, politicians,
journalists, and lay French people. In March 2004, the French Senate passed a bill that
prohibited the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in public elementary and
secondary schools on the basis that the headscarf had no place in the public realm of
education as it contradicts the basic principles of laicite and allegiance to the republic.
What about this head covering is so problematic for the French? Is it simply a piece of
cloth, a banal religious symbol, or does it signify a much deeper issue that the French
have with a relatively new ethnic group that the French find so prevalent today?
The concept of laicite, although ever-evolving, had existed for the better part of a
century before the emergence of this recent headscarf controversy. What prompted the
resurgence of a debate over appropriate religious expression in the public sphere? Until
recently, no one had made objections to the small crosses worn by Christian students or
even the turbans worn by male Sikh students. In reality, the application of laicite has
never been universal. For example, it was never applied to the territories of Alsace and
Lorraine, which were under German occupation at the time the law of 1905 was
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enacted.81 Thus, questions arise regarding the timing and the specific application of
laicite in the headscarf issue.82
This chapter will explain the reinterpretation and extension of the laicite to
include a ban on the wearing of religious symbols in public schools. Specific examples
will be used to demonstrate that this application of laicite not only exacerbates the very
problems it set out to eliminate, but also thwarts the very freedoms it set out to protect. A
thorough understanding of the recent interpretations of laicite is necessary to understand
the issues that led to the recent debate over the place of the headscarf in French public
schools.

Symbolism ofthe Headscarf
Today, France’s attitude toward the Islamic veil is riddled with contradictions. It
is seen as both liberating and oppressive, imposed and chosen, a symbol of strength and a
symbol of slavery. The image of covered women is one of passivity and submission that
epitomizes Islam to the West. The veil symbolizes the clear “otherness” of the Muslim
immigrant population in France. For this and other reasons, the French have a strong
aversion to the veil in the public sphere.
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Miriam Cooke claims that Islam has become the enemy of the post-cold war
West. The veil is an emblem of anti-West men’s movement that oppresses women. In this
way, women’s bodies serve as icons of Muslim “otherness.” These women appear to be
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domestic prisoners and symbols of oppressive patriarchy. Their veils symbolize honor
and shame, as well as belonging to a powerful and patriarchal, religious community.
To the women who wear the veil, however, it can S3onbolize power and autonomy
and can serve as a vehicle for resistance.^"* The veil can be used as a means of protest and
to ameliorate social conditions such as gender relations and class. In many situations, the
wearing of the veil assures that women will not be harassed in the streets and in the
workplace. It signifies that they are honorable women.*^ The veil is a symbol of strength
and a political statement. It is a means of marking oneself as sexually conservative within
a modern community. The more women are policed, the more visible they become. In
this way, the veil marks a woman as religiously observant, a woman who demands that
her honor be safeguarded.
Views of the veil vary drastically depending on the area of the world in which
women live. In certain societies where the veil is the norm, women become invisible
when they wear them. Conversely, in multicultural societies where many religions are
observed, women become more noticeable through veiling.

86

Many of the modem French ideas about the veil stem from a historic
preoccupation with the Orient and the harem. For the French, the veil symbolizes
seclusion, submission, and oppression because the harem, composed of Muslim women
who wore the veil, was a social construct that forced women to stay in the home. It was a
part of aristocratic life in which one’s wife remained in the home as a symbol of status
87

and a mark of luxury.

These ideas of the veil that represent women as objects, passive
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and oppressed, and that highlight Muslim “otherness” in a country where communal
unity is highly valued, lay the foundation of the problem that the jus soli, or birthright
citizens, of France have with the headscarf in the public sphere today. The banning ofthe
headscarf in public schools was a reaction to the grov^ng presence of negative images of
the headscarf.

Factors leading up to the headscarfban
The decision to ban the headscarf in schools was the result of a series of linked
events rather than a single act based on the reinterpretation of the older lai'que laws.
Politics and the media played a tremendous role in the road to the ban, as did the actions
of Muslim organizations in and outside of France. The political climate in France during
the 1980’s set the stage for the first major headscarf rift in 1989.
Throughout the decade, there was a great deal of unrest among leftist politicians.
Although

Francois Mitterand won the Presidential election of 1981, a nsing

unemployment rate over the next three years of his term led to decreased support of his
party.

The far right party, the National Front, steadily gained votes and made a

remarkable showing in the legislative elections of 1986, and the people voted for a
central right prime minister that year, Jacques Chirac.^* Even though the socialists
returned to power, the unemployment rate continued to rise, paralleled by a growing
discontent and a tendency to blame immigrants for the economic problems, even though
immigrant communities often suffered

greater than twice the

percentage

of

89

unemployment as the rest of the population.

88
89

Bowen. Why the French Don 7 Like Headscarves, 82.
Hunter. Islam, Europe’s Second Religion, 9.

46

As a result, the disillusioned leftist

politicians began to look for a new political direction. Some, like Regis Debray and
Andre Glucksmann, turned to the ideals of the Republic as their new source of political
direction. Others, leftists like philosopher Alain Finkielkraut, attacked the multicultural
slant of the early part ofthe decade and the ethical relativism that accompanied it.90
This anxiety-ridden political climate incidentally clashed with two other crucial
events in 1989 that set the stage for the first largely publicized headscarf controversy.
The first was the bicentennial anniversary of the French Revolution in July of 1989. The
left used this opportunity to celebrate the ideals of the Republic that came out of the
Revolution. They ignored, however, other aspects ofthe Revolution, such as the principle
of equality, and focused more on the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.
The second important event in 1989 brought a great deal of attention to Islam in France
and augmented the already growing fear of radical Islam, the Salmon Rushdie Affair.
Rushdie was the Muslim author of Satanic Verses, a book in which, according to
Ayatollah Khomeini who declared a fatwa against the writer, he blasphemed the Prophet
Muhammed. The affair made the French fear the perceived radically intolerant nature of
91

Islam.

Finally, in September of that year, three girls walked into Gabriel-Havez middle
school in Creil (near Paris) wearing a headscarf, just as they had for years, but on this
particular day the principal requested they remove them. The girls refused and were
expelled for behavior infringing upon the laic nature of the public school. After a great
deal of negotiation between the parents of the girls and the administration, the girls were
readmitted to the school on October 9 on condition that they remove the headscarves in
90
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class. Ten days later, however, they began wearing the scarves in class again, which
created an entirely new series of negotiations, this time involving large Muslim
organizations including the Arab League and the Paris Mosque, who argued for the
school to allow the headscarves. Christian and Jewish groups also called for a relaxed
position on the headscarf because they feared that this would lead to further limitations
on their rights to religious expression in schools.^^ Socialist organizations such as SOS Racisme shifted the focus to integration and blamed the affair on a lack of immigrant
93

assimilation.

A great debate ensued over immigrant integration and the application oflaicite to
this particular situation. Socialist Minister of Education Lionel Jospin sent the question to
the Conseil d'Etat. Then, in November, Mitterand called for the creation of an advisory
group on the integration of immigrants, the High Council on Integration, which
eventually ruled that the girls had the right to wear the headcoverings so long as they did
not disturb school life and violate the principle of laicite by infringing on others’ freedom
94

of conscience.

Despite this ruling, the three girls remained sequestered in the library of the
school in Creil. In December,two ofthe girls with Moroccan parents were called upon by
the king of Morocco (via state television broadcast) to remove their headscarves They
did so and were readmitted into regular classes on December 3, 1989. Samira, the
daughter of Tunisian parents, continued to wear her headscarf and was never
95

readmitted.
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Over the next several years, similar cases reached the Conseil d'Etat, and the
majority of the decisions, forty-one out of forty-nine, were in favor of the student. The
deciding factor was often the character and academic record of the student. If a girl had a
good attendance record, no prior disciplinary record, and good grades, she was often
readmitted to class. Conversely, any mark on the character or academic record of the
96

student often resulted in expulsion.

Then, in 1993, four girls in Nantua, France (northeast of Lyon) were asked to
remove the scarf in gym class because the teachers deemed it “dangerous.” The girls
refused, and the teachers went on strike saying that this act was in violation of laicite and
not in the best interest of the students. The brothers and fathers of the girls spoke out in
defense of the girls, and one made the statement that “Islam required women to cover
themselves,” which only aggravated the French impression of Islam and its absolutist
97

nature.

Later the same year, a student in Grenoble who was a French convert to Islam

was asked to remove her headscarf in gym class. She also refused and went on a twentytwo-day hunger strike.
Then, in 1994, Minister of Education Fran9ois Bayrou issued a directive for
principals to ban all forms of ostentatious religious symbols in public schools because it
takes students out of“/a vie communed The result of this directive was several hundred
more expulsions. Bayrou then called upon Hanifa Cherifi, a native of Algeria, to be the
98

ministerial mediator for all headscarf cases.

Organizations such as the Union of Lyon Muslim Sisters were created in order to
provide an educational alternative for the girls who were expelled. Such organizations
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would fund distance learning opportunities because the state provided no such alternative.
According to John Bowen, author of Why the French Don't Like Headscarves, the state
seemed much less interested in integrating these girls than in keeping them separated
99

from those who were already integrated.

The number of cases that the Conseil d’Etat heard rose to a peak in 1994, and
100

then leveled off at an average of 150 per year through the early 2000’s.

In the mid-

1990’s, bombs exploded in the French cities of Paris and Lyon and their suburbs, which
incited discussion of violence and the “ghettoization” of immigrants. The fear of radical
Islam grew further after the September 11 attacks.
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In the years that followed, media coverage of the veil only increased. By 2003
anything about Islam that surfaced made the news. A situation arose in September of
2003 that gave the media plenty to cover. Two sisters, Lila and Alma Levy, arrived at
Henri-Wallon high school in Aubervilliers (a suburb of Paris) wearing headscarves that
covered their neck, ears, and half their forehead and were asked to remove them. The
interesting aspect of this particular case is that the girls were daughters of a Jewish father
and an Algerian mother who had never worn a headscarf and from whom they had been
estranged for several years. The girls claimed that they chose to wear the headscarf in a
quest for identity, but the media searched for a radical Islamic group that it presumed had
102

put the girls up to it.

Later that month, when the girls were expelled, thirty-four out of

thirty-six students in the older sister’s class voted to go on strike, complaining that the
school admitted students who wore “gothic” clothes and t-shirts with Satanic slogans.
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which the students considered much more harmful than the headscarves of the Levy
sisters.

The Stasi Commission
At the time of the Levy incident. President Jacques Chirac had already called
together a special investigative committee to look into the status of laicite in the Republic
under the authority of the Ombudsman of the Republic, Bernard Stasi. The committee
had the task of exploring religion in France and the application of laic law in modem
contexts.

Nineteen members comprised the committee. Each was an expert in the

question of laicite, representing a variety of backgrounds from the school system to the
103

civil service to the private sector.

The committee heard from hundreds of witnesses

including students, teachers, and administrators, before deliberating in December of the
same year. The outcome of the commission took the form of an eighty-page report that
offered twenty-five proposals, one of which was a ban on conspicuous religious symbols
in public education through the secondary level.
Several interesting questions emerge from a careful study of this report. Why was
there only one Muslim member of the committee? Muhammed Arkoun was the only
committee member who had a Muslim background, but even he was removed from the
Muslim community. Why was there not an accurate representation of teachers
interviewed? In 2003,91% of all teachers in France had never encountered a student in a
headscarf

at

their

current

school,

yet

only

teachers

who

had

personal

experiences/problems with a headscarf wearing student were called to the committee.
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Why were the suggestions from administrators for a new law heeded over the request of
teachers to find a compromise? Administrators are more removed from student
interaction than teachers and are prone to seek objective standards such as laws to
establish protocol because it makes problems easier to handle and diminishes questions of
legality. Finally, the most questionable of all, why was no one interviewed who was
likely to offer the perspective of the girls concerned? Of all the people interviewed, not a
single girl who had been expelled was called to testify.

104

Given the relatively small number of girls who had ever worn the headscarf to
school, it is ironic that this ban was the only one ofthe twenty-five recommendations that
was immediately put into law. Generic comments and suggestions were made about
various problems that emerged in interviews such as “discourage discrimination” and
f^lOS

destroy the urban ghettos.

but no real solutions were investigated. Moreover, the fact

that a committee of nineteen individuals from such
unanimous decision on a matter as controversial as

varied backgrounds came to a nearly

this raises questions about the justness
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of the proceedings.
Many members of the committee, along with the French majority, view the law as
a symbolic act because there was never an epidemic of headscarves in schools. In 2003,
before the bill was proposed in Parliament, a reported 1,254 girls wore headscarves in
French schools. This amounted to less than one percent of the young Muslim female
population in France. Even in 1994, there were only an estimated 2,000 girls who wore
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the headscarf to schools.107 These facts again raise questions about the necessity of the
ban and the reasons why the government felt such an immediate need to regulate the
headscarf in schools.

Reactions to the HeadscarfBan
Contrary to the pervasive predictions of the media about mass expulsions, riots,
and Muslim uprisings, the transition to the new laic school setting was relatively
smooth.108 Only 639 girls appeared on the first day of school
wearing a head covering.
Of those, only around 100 refused to remove the headscarf after the first few days. One
month into the fall semester, the French Ministry of Education announced that all but
seventy-two students had been persuaded to remove their headscarf in class.

During

the first year, forty-eight students were expelled and 143 students left the French national
education system voluntarily. This number includes students who chose to pursue their
education abroad as well as others who chose to enroll at Catholic schools.
In his book Integrating Islam, Justin Laurence claims that there are two primary
reasons for this relatively smooth and calm transition. First, the headscarf issue had never
been widespread. The young women who wore the hijab were not rebellious and did not
seek to confront the French government. When school officials showed a willingness to
accommodate the students, the majority compromised.

The second factor was the

hostage-taking of two French journalists in Iraq, whose kidnappers demanded the
retraction of the headscarf ban in France for the release ofthe journalists. Muslim leaders
in France, even those who had been at the forefront of protests, unanimously responded
107
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with a call for schoolgirls to respect the new law. These leaders excoriated foreign
interference in French internal affairs and claimed loudly that “there will be no blood on
my headscarf.

110

This clearly demonstrated Muslim respect for French law over

religious obligations. Through non-compliance with the kidnappers, the French Muslims
refused to be used as pawns in an international terrorist campaign. Le Monde published
shortly thereafter that young Muslim women had been transformed in the eyes of the
Ill

French public from victims to heroes ofthe republic.

Opinions ofthe HeadscarfBan
Opinion about the headscarf ban in France differs greatly among educators,
politicians, and even the Muslim schoolgirls. Eric Finot, an English teacher in Delacroix,
believes the “law is here to protect those girls who are compelled to do things they don’t
want to do - not to be forced into marriage, not to wear the veil,

He says they are “only

asking [the girls] to abide by the principle of secularism, Touria, a student at Finot’s
school in Delacroix says “now that I’m wearing a bandanna in school

. I can’t wait to

put my veil back on. It was always important, but now even more so.«112 The issue is no
longer simply modesty, but an assertion ofidentity and rights.
Genevieve Piniau, the headteacher at Lycte Robert Doisneau in CorbeilEssonnes, explains her feelings about enforcing the headscarf ban: I had the deepest
respect for their faith, but did not want to know what their religion was.” Three students
at Piniau’s school offered their different perspectives on the ban. Some felt targeted and
discriminated against, while others felt like the ban was a good thing, created for their
no
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protection. Asma Boubker spoke out against the ban saying, “Christians have crucifixes.
why can’t we have headscarves?” Siham, on the other hand, agreed with the requirement
to remove the headscarf: “some teachers would not see beyond the scarf and judge us it’s best if we have to take it off” Rama Kourouma, also agreed that religion should not
113

be advertised in schools. “Faith is in the heart,” she said.

Teycir ben Naser, a second-year university student has opted for a discrete
bandanna because she feels the headscarf would become a distraction during oral exams.
“They might say things or look at me in a certain way, and that would undermine my
confidence.” She said,“We are studying to be able to work later, and we know that if you
wear a veil all the doors will close.” Sonia Benyahia, another student on ben Naser’s
campus noted, “I don’t know if I’ll be able to take off the scarf, so I think I’ll remain a
)>I14

housewife.

Elizabeth Badinter, a French philosopher, sees the ban on the headscarves in
schools as a necessary measure for France to be a progressive nation: If we allow
women to wear headscarves in state schools, then the republic and French
democracy
have made clear their religious tolerance but they have given
gi
up on any equality of the
«115

sexes in our country.

Her view demonstrates the common French notion that the veil

can only be a symbol ofthe oppression and subjugation of women to men.
Others outside the school system have voiced equally principled oppositions to
the ban. Rachid Hamoudi, the director of Organization of Islamic Organizations of
France (UOIF) and a large mosque in Lille, believes the ban is unjust because it targets
Muslims over other religions. Hamoudi said that “the law is unfair to Muslims, but
11.1
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we’ve put it behind us.” Green party leader Noel Mamer opposed the new law, saying “I
think it’s a very bad law, a law which takes the risk to make worse the rift between two
116

parts of the French population”.

Conclusion
The prohibition of conspicuous religious symbols in the public sphere was
ostensibly for the purposes of remaining true to laicite, protecting religious rights, and
ensuring domestic peace, but in actuality, the headscarf ban
new and large minority community into French

was designed to assimilate a

society. To the French government, the

headscarf-wearing school girls undennined the larger effort of maintaining respect for
Republican values among citizens and
assimilating immigrants into the majority
population. In many ways, the French feel tlueatened by the
growing Muslim population,
not only because of its numbers but also because of the
unrelenting dedication to faith above all else. The French

common perception of its

state has battled to develop

functional, peaceful, pluralistic society, and it will not allow i
It to be severely disrupted
again by a new religious minority.
The
question remains whether
or not the only option for the French society is
practical atheism in the public sphere. Is it
i possible to
establish
an open society in France
where each individual
can share his or her religious
convictions freely without harming
others and still live
harmoniously? Society
the public
sphere will never be entirely
devoid of religion, and ^
according to Jose Casanova, It
i should
not be. The presence of
can be beneficial to .society as long

I’cligioii in tlie public spllCl'C
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as the right to privacy and the sanctity of the principle of freedom of conscience are
117

respected.

Other questions arise as to whether the French concept of Republicanism is so
deeply rooted that there is no room for religious tolerance in the public sphere. Is an
extension or reinterpretation of the notion of Republicanism rather than a reinterpretation
or extension of the notion of laicite possible? Many among the French Muslim
community continue to sacrifice a great piece of their identity in order to assimilate and
respect the laic laws. The question is whether this is absolutely necessary to achieve
lasting peace between different ethnic and religious groups in France.
Will Kymlicka argues that the hijab situation calls for group-differentiated rights.
The rights granted the individual in France are not enough to protect the rights of this
118

Muslim majority.

Thus,the law of laicite in France is fair in that it is equally applied to

people of all religious affiliations, but it is unjust in that it mostly affects and
discriminates against the Muslim minority because of the basic tenets of the Islamic faith
that require “conspicuous symbols” such as the veil to be worn.
The issue of the headscarf in France is far from resolved. The more immediate
solution will likely entail the creation of additional Muslim confessional schools, the very
first of which was created out of the original headscarf affair to provide an education to
the seventeen girls who were expelled for wearing the veil in school. There are currently
only four private Muslim schools in all of France, but funding campaigns are in progress
119

for new schools in several cities.
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For a lasting solution, the French parliament must grapple with the question of
minority group rights, the role of religion as an identity marker, and the persisting
presence of religion in the public sphere if it desires to reach an equitable and enduring
solution to /'affaire dufoulard.
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Conclusion
As a result of a series of negative events in France’s history, such as the religious
wars and the Dreyfus affair, the French state established the policy of laicite ostensibly to
protect minority religious groups from discrimination, ensure the freedom of religion to
all citizens of the Republic, and to stem the tide of violent conflict. In practice, however,
it has effectively done the opposite through the extreme limitation of religious rights in
the public sphere.

The headscarf affair is a clear example of this. The Muslim

community in France, a religious minority, is unable to maintain one of its central
practices, the wearing of the hijab, because it is deemed “ostentatious” or proselytical,
which is in violation of laicite and in conflict with French Republican principles.
The state ignores one of the most basic notions of Republicanism, which is its
contract with the people. In this contract with the people, the state promises to protect and
provide for the citizen’s best interest. Moreover, one ofthe primary responsibilities ofthe
government is to educate the citizen. As has been shown in the headscarf affair, the
French state has denied education to one segment of the population which needs it most,
the immigrant women. It has thus forced them to provide out of limited means for their
own education. In essence, the state has implied that it does not truly consider this group
“citizens of the Republic” because it feels little responsibility for them and
a greater need
to protect “les Frangais de souche” from them. The ban on the veil, a symbol of
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oppression and submission to the French, in practice requires that private religious
conviction be sublimated to the state.
Globalization has led to the development of increasingly multicultural societies.
In this contemporary society, laicite has no longer proven effective at incorporating
religious minorities. Consequently, the strict interpretation of laicite, grounded in
revolutionary Republican values, has been rendered obsolete and ineffective. In the
earlier days of the French Republic when the population was relatively homogenous, the
policy was arguably more effective. In modem days, however, it is certainly no longer
effective at incorporating new religious minority groups such as the Muslims.
If the French wish to avoid the violence and controversies brought about through
the riots and headscarf affair, they must pursue a new policy on public religious
expression. They may choose to move away from the concept of laicite, which allows for
almost no public display of religion, and work instead toward a state that allows greater
religiosity in the public sphere, so as to incorporate more easily the minority groups in
their midst. On the other hand, the French may choose to reevaluate their idea of what it
means to be “French” and altogether do away with the policy of laicite, which requires
assimilation, in order to include new cultures and religions. What the
French cannot do is
ignore the reality of a population

now representing a wide variety of cultures and

religions.
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